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459 
THE LIBERTY IMPACT OF GENDER 
Kingsly Alec McConnell* 
Abstract: Can the federal government unilaterally change your gender? In October of 2018, 
the New York Times revealed that the Trump Administration’s Department of Health and 
Human Services was considering a new federal definition of “gender.” The policy would 
redefine gender as a “biological, immutable condition determined by genitalia at birth.” This 
policy places transsex people at a substantial risk of deprivation of property and speech rights, 
as gender implicates both property and expression. It also impedes the exercise of substantive 
due process rights and privileges and immunities. For example, inaccurate gender designations 
can hinder a transsex parent’s ability to raise children, and accurate gender markers protect the 
right to a common calling by shielding transsex people from employment discrimination and 
procedural barriers. 
This Comment argues that gender designations represent both a property right and a 
protected expression of speech. Government-issued gender designations, or gender markers, 
have taken on a special legal identity that is distinct from assigned or lived gender, and these 
markers frequently translate into discrete rights for transsex individuals. The Trump 
Administration’s policy not only upends traditional understandings of gender under state and 
federal law, but also attempts to dissuade transsex people from engaging in public life, and 
ultimately, existing in the world. Because transsex people have a liberty interest in maintaining 
an accurate gender designation, the Trump Administration’s redefinition is unconstitutional. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
* J.D. and LL.M. Candidate in Sustainable International Development, University of Washington 
School of Law, Class of 2020. This Comment would not be possible without guidance and creative 
insight from Professor Peter Nicolas. Additional thanks to the Washington Law Review team for their 
time and efforts in editing this piece. 
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“[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter 
much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its 
substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of 
the existing order.” . . . It is precisely because the issue 
raised . . . touches the heart of what makes individuals what they 
are that we should be especially sensitive to the rights of those 
whose choices upset the majority.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
In October 2018, a leaked memorandum indicated that the Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) sought to redefine the legal 
meaning of gender.2 Instead of determining gender based on modern 
conceptions of biology and neuroscience3 or even deferring to state law 
on the question,4 the new conception would define gender as a “biological, 
immutable condition determined by genitalia at birth.”5 Under the policy, 
a gender designation listed on a birth certificate would be presumptive 
evidence of an individual’s gender, but the designation could ultimately 
be rebutted by genetic evidence.6 While some individuals will justifiably 
                                                   
1. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) 
(quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)), overruled by Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
2. Erica L. Green, Katie Benner & Robert Pear, ‘Transgender’ Could be Defined Out of Existence 
Under Trump Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/21/us
/politics/transgender-trump-administration-sex-definition.html [https://perma.cc/ZA5C-X9VX]. 
3. See, e.g., Sari M. van Anders et al., Biological Sex, Gender, and Public Policy, 4  
POL’Y INSIGHTS FROM BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 194, 194, 199 (2017) (“For gender/sex policy, science 
shows no one aspect of sex (hormones, genes, genitals, gonads) trumps others—gender identity 
matters most.”). 
4. Delineation of gender has traditionally been left to the states. See infra Part I. Until this policy, 
the federal government has respected and deferred to state law definitions of gender; for example, all 
federal identification documents defer to state birth certificates for demarcations of gender, regardless 
of whether the state recognizes, or does not recognize, the genders of transsex people. See infra note 
11. A federalism issue arises when the federal government steps into an area “within the authority 
and realm of the separate States.” United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 764 (2013). When the 
United States Supreme Court struck down the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 2013, the Court 
found that the definition and regulation of domestic relationships belonged to the state’s regulatory 
sphere. Id. at 766. Like DOMA, the Trump Administration’s policy challenges a long-established 
state regulatory scheme. See infra Part I. When a state grants a corrected gender marker, it “confer[s] 
upon [a transsex individual] a dignity and status of immense import.” Cf. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 768. 
In contrast, the federal government’s newest policy “uses th[e] state-defined class for the opposite 
purpose—to impose restrictions and disabilities,” thus seeking to injure a class—transsex people—
many states specifically sought to protect. Cf. id. at 768. 
5. Green et al., supra note 2. 
6. Id. It is unclear how the proposed redefinition of gender would apply to individuals whose natal 
phenotype and genotype do not align; for example, a cissex woman who is born with a vulva but has 
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be concerned with the federal government prying into their genetic 
information and particularized reproductive and sexual health, in the legal 
world, it is well settled that sex—regardless of its correlation to lived 
gender—is ultimately defined by government.7 
Having a gender designation that accurately reflects one’s lived 
experience is frequently taken for granted by many cissex8 people. Yet the 
legal paradigm is extraordinarily evident for those who live in the 
uncomfortable middle of an exclusionary, binary legal designation. Such 
binary conceptions of gender favor cissex people, particularly in 
effectuation of rights and liberties.9 
Designating genders in ambiguous or contested scenarios was a task 
historically left to courts.10 More recently, state legislatures have begun 
                                                   
XY sex-determination chromosomes. See, e.g., Miroslav Dumic et al., Report of Fertility in a Woman 
with a Predominantly 46,XY Karyotype in a Family with Multiple Disorders of Sexual Development, 
93 J. CLINICAL ENDROCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 182 (2008) (discussing the unassisted pregnancy 
of a cissex woman with a Y chromosome); FAQ, Does Having a Y Chromosome Make Someone a 
Man?, INTERSEX SOC’Y N. AM., http://www.isna.org/faq/y_chromosome [https://perma.cc/LRR4-
6L3H] (“[I]t is simply incorrect to think that you can tell a person’s sex just looking at whether he or 
she has a Y chromosome.”). If an individual’s assigned gender is recorded incorrectly on their birth 
certificate, they would have to rebut their gender through karyotype testing. For those like the cissex 
woman with a Y chromosome, she would be unable to rebut the gender designation on her 
birth  certificate. 
7. See generally infra Part I. 
8. A cissexual or cissex person is an individual whose assigned gender matches their gender 
identity. See Cissexual/Cisgender: Decentralizing the Dominant Group, EMINISM.ORG (June 07, 
2002), http://www.eminism.org/interchange/2002/20020607-wmstl.html [https://perma.cc/AXW8-
CFW5] (noting that “[b]y using the term ‘cissexual’ and ‘cisgender,’ [trans activists] de-centralize the 
dominant group, exposing it as merely one possible alternative rather than the ‘norm’ against which 
trans people are defined”).  
9. See infra Part IV. 
10. See infra section I.A. 
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addressing the needs of transsex11 and intersex12 individuals for 
guaranteed changes to gender markers.13 Absent policies and laws that 
expressly permit alterations to gender markers, transsex people are often 
not entitled to the benefits of legal gender. And, perhaps more crucially, 
they are displaced from the exercise of constitutional rights implicit 
in  gender.14 
Since an explosive New York Times article revealed the proposed 
policy to the public,15 HHS has shifted its strategy. HHS enforces Title IX 
of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, which prohibits 
discrimination “on the basis of sex” in educational programs and activities 
                                                   
11. For the purposes of this Comment, I will be utilizing “transsex” to refer to individuals who have 
medically transitioned from one sex to another, without defining a specific form of medical transition. 
This Comment utilizes this narrow category of transgender people because current federal guidelines 
require that individuals generally undergo some form of medical transition to alter their gender 
designation. See, e.g., Program Operations Manual System (POMS), SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0110212200 [https://perma.cc/FLM6-QVXV] (social security 
requirements); Change of Sex Marker, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, U.S. DEP’T ST.—BUREAU CONSULAR 
AFFS., https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/passports/apply-renew-passport/change-of-sex-
marker.html [https://perma.cc/H2LJ-QPB5] (passport requirements); Chapter 10.22 Change of 
Gender Designation on Documents Issued by USCIS, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., 
https://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-1067/Chapter10-22.html 
[https://perma.cc/7HSK-XD2V] (citizenship and immigration document requirements). But see 
Admin. Law–Identity Records–Soc. Sec. Admin. Eliminates Surgical Requirement for Changing Trans 
Individuals’ Gender Markers–Soc. Sec. Admin., Program Operations Manual System, Rm 10212.200 
Changing Numident Data for Reasons Other Than Name Change, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1863 (2014) 
(noting that individuals may now submit amended birth certificates, a court order indicating the 
change of gender, or a physician’s verification of the new gender, which depending on the applicant’s 
location may not require any particular medical procedure). To encourage scholars to prioritize 
humanizing language for the LGBTQ community, I opt to use “transsex person” over “transsexual,” 
while acknowledging that many will not personally identify with this language. 
12. An intersex person is “born with a reproductive or sexual anatomy that doesn’t seem to fit the 
typical definitions of female or male.” What is Intersex?, INTERSEX SOC’Y N. AM., 
http://www.isna.org/faq/what_is_intersex [https://perma.cc/2ZMC-UHFA]. Because some intersex 
people will require alteration of their assigned gender marker to more accurately reflect their lived 
gender, this Comment uses transsex in an expansive form to include intersex people. 
13. To date, all states except for Kansas, Ohio, and Tennessee permit transsex people to alter their 
gender markers. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2422c (1990), as interpreted by In re Estate of Gardiner, 22 
P.3d 1086 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the statute permitting minor corrections to birth 
certificates did not include corrections to gender based on transsex status); OHIO REV. CODE 
§ 3705.15 (2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-203(d) (West 2019) (“The sex of an individual shall not 
be changed on the original certificate of birth as a result of sex change surgery.”); see also In re 
Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 831 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987) (determining that the legislature did not intend 
gender marker alteration on the basis of transsex status by enacting its birth record statute). For a 
complete list of statutes, regulations, and court decisions on state gender alterations, see Changing 
Birth Certificate  Sex  Designations:  State-By-State  Guidelines,  LAMBDA LEGAL, 
https://www.lambdalegal.org/know-your-rights/article/trans-changing-birth-certificate-sex-
designations [https://perma.cc/AE5L-QMPB]. 
14. See generally infra Parts IV, V. 
15. See Green et al., supra note 2. 
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funded by the federal government.16 On June 14, 2019, HHS published a 
proposed rule to eliminate the definition of “on the basis of sex,”17 which 
previously recognized and protected transsex individuals from 
discrimination in an educational setting.18 Due to impending Supreme 
Court litigation,19 the HHS has declined to finalize a new definition at this 
time.20 This has essentially stalled any movement of the gender policy 
highlighted by the HHS memorandum. However, the fundamental 
inquiry—that is, whether federal agencies can unilaterally change a 
person’s gender designation—remains relevant and of deep concern to 
transsex people living under the Trump Administration. 
This Comment argues that legal gender is an independent concept, 
separate from lived or experienced gender, that is translated into 
constitutional rights—specifically, property and speech rights—through 
gender markers and designations.21 Even in an increasingly egalitarian 
society, gender remains relevant to the spaces and accommodations 
people occupy.22 Legal gender also impacts the exercise of substantive 
                                                   
16. Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or Activities, 84 Fed. Reg. 
27,846, 27,853 (June 14, 2019) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 86, 92, 147, 155, & 156). 
17. See generally id. 
18. Id. at 27,856 (noting that HHS, in conjunction with the Department of Justice and Department 
of Education, previously took the position that “on the basis of sex” included gender identity). 
19. See infra note 207; see also Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. 
granted, __U.S.__, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019); Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 723 F. App’x 964 (11th Cir. 
2018), cert. granted, __U.S.__, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019).   
20. Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or Activities, 84 Fed. Reg. at 27,857. 
21. Gender markers or gender designations are the delineation of gender on birth certificates and 
identification documents; traditionally “M” for male or “F” for female. The current trend across the 
United States and other developed nations is to also permit an “X” gender designation. See Amy 
Harmon, Which Box Do You Check? Some States are Offering a Nonbinary Option, N.Y. TIMES (May 
29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/29/us/nonbinary-drivers-licenses.html 
[https://perma.cc/U9DD-DH6D]. This marker is popular with non-binary people and it is an alluring 
option for individuals who reject government involvement with gender entirely. This Comment does 
not attempt to attack the constitutionality of binary legal designations, but rather argues that the 
misclassification of binary transsex people under the current regime is unconstitutional. For more on 
non-binary gender markers and the law, see generally Jessica A. Clarke, They, Them, and Theirs, 132 
HARV. L. REV. 894 (2019). 
22. See Kothmann v. Rosario, 558 F. App’x 907 (11th Cir. 2014) (bathroom and locker room access 
in public universities); Crosby v. Reynolds, 763 F. Supp. 666 (D. Me. 1991) (sex-segregated prisons); 
Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cty., 318 F. Supp. 3d 1293, 1296–321 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (bathroom 
access in public schools); Keohane v. Jones, 328 F. Supp. 3d 1288 (N.D. Fla. 2018) (sex-segregated 
prisons and access to medical treatment); Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of the Commonwealth Sys. 
of Higher Educ., 97 F. Supp. 3d 657 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (bathroom and locker room access in public 
universities); Erin E. Buzuvis, Transgender Student-Athletes and Sex-Segregated Sport: Developing 
Policies of Inclusion for Intercollegiate and Interscholastic Athletics, 21 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & 
ENT. L. 1, 5–7 (2011) (sex-segregated sports); Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 
731, 775 (2007). 
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due process rights and privileges and immunities.23 The Trump 
Administration’s proposal would rescind accurate gender markers for 
transsex people, thus harming the property and speech interests inherent 
to legal gender. This Comment concludes by finding that transsex 
individuals have a constitutionally protected interest in an accurate 
gender  designation. 
Gender and property are already deeply intertwined.24 This Comment 
expounds upon theoretical concepts laid forth in Cheryl I. Harris’s 
Whiteness as Property, a renowned thesis on the interconnection of race 
and property in United States legal and social history, but with 
consideration of legal designations of gender.25 It also draws upon Charles 
A. Reich’s The New Property, which conceived an inherent connection 
between property, liberty, and life.26 Other legal scholars have already 
connected heteronormativity27 and cisnormativity28 with property rights,29 
and sex and gender to property and intellectual property,30 respectively. 
This Comment adds to the present literature by analyzing the newly 
leaked federal policy, which would inhibit alteration of federal gender 
designations and revert accurate gender designations for transsex 
people.31 Through the lens of property law, free speech jurisprudence, and 
                                                   
23. See infra Part IV. 
24. See, e.g., Lauren Wigginton, Heteronormative Identities as Property: Adversely Possessing 
Maleness and Femaleness, 23 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 139, 142 (2014) (explaining that 
early common law allocated property rights based on gender). 
25. See generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993). 
Although Plessy v. Ferguson rejected the argument that whiteness was actually a property right, the 
United States Supreme Court stated that the outer demarcations of race “is one upon which there is a 
difference of opinion in the different states.” 163 U.S. 537, 549, 552 (1896), overruled by Brown v. 
Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee Cty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court refused to define black 
or white, leaving those “questions to be determined under the laws of each state.” Id. at 552. This 
contrasts the federal government’s proposed policy, which would supersede traditional state 
definitions of gender. See supra note 4. 
26. See generally Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) [hereinafter Reich, 
The New Property].  
27. Heteronormativity is defined as “of, relating to, or based on the attitude that heterosexuality is 
the only normal and natural expression of sexuality.” Heteronormative, MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/heteronormative  [https://perma.cc/3FLD-S2M3]. 
28. Cisnormativity, or cissexual assumption, refers to concepts that erase transex lives and 
experiences, wherein cissex people are presumed to be normal and transsex people abnormal. See 
JULIA SERANO, WHIPPING GIRL: A TRANSSEXUAL WOMAN ON SEXISM AND THE SCAPEGOATING OF 
FEMININITY 164–70 (2007). 
29. See generally Wigginton, supra note 24.  
30. See generally Sonia K. Katyal, The Numerus Clausus of Sex, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 389 (2017). 
31. Green et al., supra note 2; Katie Benner & Robert Pear, ‘Transgender’ Could Be Defined Out 
of Existence Under Trump Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2
018/10/21/us/politics/transgender-trump-administration-sex-definition.html [https://perma.cc/ZA5C-
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gender theory, this Comment contextualizes present literature with a real 
and impending threat to transsex people’s wellbeing. It ultimately 
concludes that the Trump Administration’s proposed policy 
is  unconstitutional.32 
First, this Comment argues that gender designations are a type of 
property or government-created form of wealth that are essential to life, 
liberty, and economic security.33 Analyzing various theories of property 
rights, this Comment draws connections between the characteristics of 
property and gender designations. For transsex individuals, the 
constitutional implications of gender as property are profound. Inaccurate 
gender designations frequently implicate transsex people’s substantive 
due process rights and privileges and immunities. For example, accurate 
gender designations grant many transsex people the assumption of 
cisness,34 isolating them from transphobic attacks and discrimination. 
                                                   
X9VX]. 
32. The Trump Administration’s proposal raises a plethora of constitutional issues that are outside 
the scope of this Comment. The federal government’s involvement in the collection and assessment 
of genetic material to decipher a “legal” gender implicates privacy law, technology law, and 
unreasonable searches and seizures. The proposal may also raise an equal protection inquiry, if the 
Trump Administration distinguishes between transsex and cissex individuals in the implementation 
of its new policy. It would not be surprising if the policy facially discriminated against transsex 
people, as the Trump Administration has relentlessly targeted transsex individuals for discrimination 
and erasure of legal protections. For an ongoing list of such discriminatory policies, see The 
Discrimination Administration: Trump’s Record of Action Against Transgender People, NAT’L CTR. 
TRANSGENDER EQUAL., https://transequality.org/the-discrimination-administration 
[https://perma.cc/GY4S-YA36]. If property rights are attributed to gender, unilaterally changing an 
individual’s gender marker may constitute a Fifth Amendment taking. On a state level, failure to 
recognize an individual’s gender designation across states lines may be a violation of the full faith 
and credit clause. This is an ongoing question across state borders. See, e.g., In re Marriage License 
for Nash, Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095, at *4–5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 
2003) (holding that an individual’s birth certificate in another state may be rebutted by evidence of 
transsex status; also, finding that the legislative policy of Ohio was to not recognize a marriage 
between a transsex man and a cissex woman). Failure to recognize a transsex person’s marriage is 
now unconstitutional with the holding of Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); 
however, the birth certificate recognition issue remains undecided. For more on the constitutional 
implications, see generally Julie A. Greenberg & Marybeth Herald, You Can’t Take It with You: 
Constitutional Consequences of Interstate Gender-Identity Rulings, 80 WASH. L. REV. 819 (2005). 
The federal government’s redefinition also raises a federalism concern, as all but three states 
purposively permit alterations of gender markers for transsex people. See supra note 4; infra note 71. 
While these constitutional issues are live, I leave these concerns for another day. Instead, this 
Comment focuses on two areas of rights that are almost certainly implicated by the government’s 
policy. Because the policy stems from a leaked memorandum, it is unclear what the specific 
implementation methods would require or if it will ever come to fruition. Absent more information, 
this Comment targets two areas of constitutional law that stem directly from depriving transsex 
individuals of an accurate gender designation in nearly all circumstances: property and speech rights. 
33. See infra Part II. 
34. See infra section IV.A. 
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Further, having matching identification documents helps protect 
individuals from discrimination.35 
Second, the Trump Administration’s proposed redefinition constitutes 
“compelled speech,” in violation of the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.36 It is well-settled that the First Amendment protects 
both “the right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”37 
Under the compelled speech doctrine, the federal government may not 
intrude on an individual’s right to “decide for himself or herself the ideas 
and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.”38 The 
expression of assigned-gender on a birth certificate is an inaccurate and 
forced statement of self and identity.39 Gender is thus an expression of 
speech.40 In addition, when an individual’s federal gender designation 
differentiates from their state gender designation or physical appearance, 
they are forced to disclose their transsex status to explain the 
discrepancy.41 In some cases, even a birth certificate indicating that it was 
“amended” may constitute compelled speech and can interfere with First 
Amendment rights.42 
These impacts challenge the mere existence of transsex people in legal 
and social society. Inaccurate gender designations affect all areas of a 
transsex person’s life, ranging from employment and parental rights to the 
mere use of public facilities. Indeed, gender markers have special value 
compared to other forms of government-created privileges, as gender 
designations can impact substantive due process rights and privileges and 
immunities.43 Due to the liberty impact of gender, this Comment finds that 
transsex people have a constitutional interest in maintaining an accurate 
gender designation, and the Trump Administration’s proposed rule 
is  unlawful. 
This Comment proceeds in five Parts. Part I illustrates how courts 
historically dealt with gender designations on a case-by-case basis. State 
                                                   
35. See infra section IV.B. 
36. For an overview of the compelled speech doctrine and its impact on gender designations and 
other identifiers—primarily gender pronouns, see generally Tyler Sherman, Note, All Employers Must 
Wash Their Speech Before Returning to Work: The First Amendment & Compelled Use of Employees’ 
Preferred Gender Pronouns, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 219 (2017). 
37. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). 
38. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 213 (2013) (quoting 
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994)). 
39. See infra section V.B. 
40. See infra section V.B. 
41. F.V. v. Barron, 286 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1135 (D. Idaho 2018). 
42. See id. (noting that both parties agreed that including revision history on a state birth certificate 
constitutes compelled speech, so the court would not address the merits of the claim). 
43. See infra Part IV. 
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courts (and legislatures) created independent legal regimes for gender 
marker alteration, and these regimes impacted transsex people’s right to 
marry and bring up children. Part II overviews theories of property. It 
considers traditional characteristics of property rights, as well as newer 
conceptions of wealth known as “the new property.44 Part III analyzes the 
compelled speech doctrine under First Amendment law, considering the 
breadth of activities that constitute “speech.” Part IV illustrates how 
gender markers impact substantive due process rights and privileges and 
immunities of transsex people, arguing that transsex people have a vested 
interest in retaining an accurate gender marker. Part V then combines 
theories of property and free speech law to delineate how gender 
designations implicate constitutional interests, contending that rescinding 
or prohibiting accurate gender designations is unconstitutional. It 
concludes by arguing that the Trump Administration’s proposed 
redefinition of gender is unconstitutional. 
I. GENDER AND THE JUDICIARY 
Transsex individuals have frequently appeared before courts of law to 
argue for recognition of their gender.45 In fact, family law jurisprudence 
has often turned the gender of transsex individuals into a core legal 
inquiry.46 In these cases, courts are confronted with the question: “[w]hen 
is a man a man, and when is a woman a woman?”47 This Part will lay the 
historical foundation for state regulation of this question. In essence, 
courts “assumed the crucial task of [gender] classification, and accepted 
and embraced the then-current theories of [gender],” often as biological 
fact.48 Through jurisprudence—and subsequent legislation—states have 
managed to develop their own respective regimes for amendments to 
gender markers. This means state courts frequently authorized corrections 
for transsex individuals, but on some occasions, they have hesitated to 
create public policy on gender marker alterations absent legislative or 
administrative help.49 States have strengthened these regimes by expressly 
                                                   
44. See generally Reich, The New Property, supra note 26. 
45. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1988) (rejecting a transsex person’s 
petition to alter the gender designation on their birth certificate); In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio 
Prob. Ct. 1987) (same); K. v. Health Div., Dep’t of Human Res., 560 P.2d 1070 (Or. 1977) (same). 
46. See, e.g., In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 86 (Md. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that Maryland courts have 
jurisdiction to rule upon petitions for gender marker alterations, and remanding to the trial court for a 
factual showing of transsex petitioner’s gender). 
47. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 223 (Tex. App. 1999). 
48. Cf. Harris, supra note 25, at 1737. 
49. See, e.g., In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d at 832 (holding that “the legislature should change the 
statutes, if it is to be the public policy” of Ohio to permit transsex people to change their gender 
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permitting transsex individuals to alter gender designations. For example, 
today, all but three states permit alterations to individual birth 
certificates.50 However, judicial history remains relevant to understanding 
how gender has been historically rooted in state regulatory power, and 
how this exercise of power has ultimately impacted the fundamental rights 
of transsex people. 
The earliest published case of gender marker alteration concerning a 
transsex person is Anonymous v. Weiner.51 In 1966, the Supreme Court of 
New York rejected a transsex woman’s petition to alter her name and 
gender designation on her birth certificate.52 Relying on statements from 
the Committee on Public Health of the New York Academy of Medicine, 
the court refused “to substitute its views for those of the administrative 
body.”53 It granted deference to the Committee, which was staunchly 
opposed to alterations of gender on birth certificates for transsex people 
on the basis that a transsex person’s interest to have an accurate reflection 
of gender on their birth certificate was “outweighed by the public interest 
for protection against fraud.”54 
However, not even two years later, the Civil Court of the City of New 
York blatantly rejected this rationale by permitting a transsex woman to 
change her name on her birth certificate.55 While a gender marker change 
was not at the forefront of the plaintiff’s legal claim, the court explicitly 
rejected the scientific and legal rationale proffered by the Weiner Court: 
This court is in complete disagreement with the conclusion 
reached by the [Committee on Public Health of the New York 
Academy of Medicine]. A [female] transsexual who submits to a 
sex-reassignment is anatomically and psychologically a female in 
fact. . . . It has further been stated that “male to female 
transsexuals are still chromosomally males while ostensibly 
females.” Nevertheless, should the question of a person’s identity 
be limited by the results of mere histological section or 
biochemical analysis, with a complete disregard for the human 
brain, the organ responsible for most functions and reactions, 
                                                   
markers); K., 560 P.2d at 1072 n.5 (holding that whether altered gender markers should be issued to 
transsex people “is a matter of public policy to be decided by the Oregon legislature”). 
50. See infra note 71. 
51. 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1966). 
52. Id. at 320, 324. 
53. Id. at 323. 
54. Id. at 322–23. 
55. In re Anonymous, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1968). 
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many so exquisite in nature, including sex orientation? I 
think  not.56 
This perception of sex, which includes a gradation of factors ranging from 
genotypical sex57 to gender identity, is in line with modern jurisprudence 
on gender. Although there is no judicial consensus on the meaning of 
“sex,” courts in the twenty-first century have been more receptive to 
definitions of sex that encompass ambiguity. For instance, courts have 
identified up to seven factors that may be relevant in sex determination: 
(1) internal morphologic sex; (2) external morphologic sex; (3) gonadal 
sex; (4) genotypic sex; (5) hormonal sex; (6) phenotypic sex; and 
(7) sexual (or gender) identity.58 
The role of gender designations became increasingly more complicated 
where marriage was involved. In 1971, Anonymous v. Anonymous59 
concerned a noncommissioned officer in the United States Army who 
sought a declaration of his marital status by the Supreme Court of New 
York. He alleged that he married his wife prior to having intimate relations 
with her—after which, he discovered she was transsex.60 By the time of 
the proceedings, his wife had undergone gender confirmation surgery,61 
but he asked the court to declare the marriage invalid.62 In finding that no 
marriage contract ever existed, the court determined that “[t]he law makes 
no provision for a ‘marriage’ between persons of the same sex.”63 The 
court recognized that the defendant’s “sex ha[d] been changed to female 
by operative procedures,” but nevertheless held that “[w]hat happened to 
the defendant after the marriage ceremony is irrelevant, since the parties 
never lived together.”64 
In this statement, the Anonymous Court provided an interesting caveat. 
The court held that the woman was legally “male” prior to her gender 
confirmation surgery (and thus her marriage).65 However, the court’s 
                                                   
56. Id. at 838. 
57. Genotype refers to the genetic constitution of an individual, typically in reference to a particular 
trait or set of traits. Genotype, MERRIAM-WEBSTER MED. DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/genotype#medicalDictionary [https://perma.cc/MH5L-FP4Y]. In this 
discussion, genotypic sex refers to sex as narrowly defined by the XY sex-determination system. 
58. See, e.g., In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 73 (Md. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that “[t]here is a recognized 
medical viewpoint that gender is not determined by any single criterion,” but that up to “seven factors 
may be relevant”). 
59. 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1971). 
60. Id. at 500. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. (emphasis added). 
65. Id. at 499. 
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rationale indicates that a transsex woman who has medically transitioned 
prior to marriage (and who subsequently lives with her husband as a 
married couple) is “female” for marital purposes.66 
This caveat was not actually exceptional in jurisprudence; it was 
similarly espoused by the Superior Court of New Jersey in M.T. v. J.T.67 
In M.T. v. J.T., the court determined that a transsex woman who 
underwent gender confirmation surgery became “a member of the female 
sex for marital purposes,” and that her marriage to a man was legitimate.68 
Because her husband had lived with her, he was legally “obligated to 
support her as his wife,”69 regardless of her transsex status. A notable part 
of the court’s analysis was the fact that both parties had lived together as 
husband and wife.70 
To contrast, many states have had forceful histories denying 
recognition of transsex people’s genders.71 For example, in In re 
Declaratory Relief for Ladrach,72 a transsex woman’s marriage was under 
scrutiny because her birth certificate listed her as male.73 The Probate 
Court of Stark County, Ohio came to the same conclusion as the court in 
Anonymous v. Anonymous; however, it based its holding on public policy 
and its role as a judicial, rather than legislative, entity.74 The Ladrach 
Court stated: “only three states, Arizona, Louisiana and Illinois, have 
statutes that allow the birth record of a transsexual to be changed 
following sex reassignment surgery. . . . However, another twelve states 
have permitted a post-operative change of sex designation on birth 
records.”75 It then concluded by deferring to the legislature: “it is this 
court’s opinion that the legislature should change the statutes, if it is to be 
                                                   
66. Id. at 500. 
67. 140 N.J. Super. 77 (1976). 
68. Id. at 90. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 79, 87–88. 
71. As of 2020, three states (Kansas, Ohio, and Tennessee) continue to refuse alterations of gender 
markers on birth certificates for transsex people. See supra note 13; F.V. v. Barron, 286 F. Supp. 3d 
1131, 1136 n.4 (D. Idaho 2018). Tennessee is the only state that explicitly forbids the alteration of 
gender for transsex or intersex people through gender confirmation surgery. TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-
3-203(d) (West 2019) (“The sex of an individual shall not be changed on the original certificate of 
birth as a result of sex change surgery.”); Spade, supra note 22, at 735. Some states have found that 
denying the alteration of a gender marker based on the individual’s transsex status is a violation of 
the equal protection clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Barron, 286 F. Supp. 3d 
at  1135. 
72. 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987). 
73. Id. at 829. 
74. See id. at 832. 
75. Id. at 830 (emphasis added). 
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the public policy of the state of Ohio to issue marriage licenses to post-
operative transsexuals.”76 
In 1977, the Supreme Court of Oregon also addressed the birth 
certificate inquiry and found that it was likely “the intent of the legislature 
of Oregon that a ‘birth certificate’ [be] an historical record of the facts as 
they existed at the time of birth.”77 Therefore, legislative authorization 
was necessary for the amendment of gender on a birth certificate.78 In 
doing so, the court denied a post-operative transsex man’s79 request to be 
listed as male and reversed the lower court’s determination that his birth 
certificate represent “a record of facts as they presently exist.”80 
Intriguingly, the court mentioned that Oregon law permitted issuance of a 
new birth certificate when the name of a child’s parent is changed,81 but 
failed to address the fact that such an alteration would necessarily entail 
that a birth certificate did not reflect the “facts as they existed at the time 
of birth.”82 
In Littleton v. Prange,83 the Court of Appeals of Texas grappled with 
the delineation of gender for a transsex woman.84 The court analyzed case 
precedent from various jurisdictions85 and held that a transsex woman 
who had fully transitioned was nonetheless “male” under Texas law.86 
Because Texas prohibited same-sex marriages, the court declared her 
marriage to a man invalid.87 A decade later, the Texas legislature 
overruled Littleton through passage of section 2.005 of the Texas Family 
Code, which provided that individuals may change their name and sex 
designation through court order for means of obtaining a 
marriage  license.88 
The federal government’s current policy, which allows transsex people 
to amend gender markers on documents, replicates most state regimes.89 
                                                   
76. Id. at 832. 
77. K. v. Health Div., Dep’t of Human Res., 560 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Or. 1977). 
78. See id. at 1071–72. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 1072 (emphasis added). 
81. Id. at 1071. 
82. Id. at 1072. 
83. 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999). 
84. Id. at 223–24. 
85. Id. at 226–29. 
86. Id. at 231. 
87. Id. at 231. 
88. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.005(b)(8) (West 2019). Texas also now permits direct alterations to 
birth certificates through court order. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 192.011 (West 2019). 
89. See supra notes 11, 13. 
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State jurisprudence on gender alteration helps demonstrate the extreme 
consequences of the Trump Administration’s proposed policy, as the 
policy would usurp the state’s historic authority to define gender. Overall, 
state courts have a long history of grappling with the gender designations 
of transsex people. Without guidance in the twentieth century, courts have 
had to weigh the rights of transsex individuals, the testimony of medical 
experts, and the court’s role as a neutral arbitrator rather than a policy 
maker. In many of these cases, gender has been better addressed by state 
legislatures stepping in and delineating how gender markers may be 
altered in the first place.90 
II. THEORIES OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Property is nothing but the basis of expectation[] . . . consist[ing] 
in an established expectation, in the persuasion of being able to 
draw such and such advantage from the thing possessed. . . . This 
theory does not suggest that all value or all expectations give rise 
to property, but those expectations in tangible or intangible things 
which are valued and protected by the law are property.91 
 
There is no universally accepted definition of property. Therefore, this 
Part will overview some of the various conceptions of property and 
highlight the main attributes among those differing theories. It begins by 
overviewing traditional theories of property. Then it will extrapolate on 
“new property” rights, which are government-created forms of wealth or 
privilege that sit outside the traditional conception of property.92 As 
Charles Reich notes, these privileges are important to the exercise of 
liberty93 and should be explicitly recognized as rights.94 Gender provides 
access to bathrooms and locker rooms in public schools95 and 
                                                   
90. See supra note 13. 
91. Harris, supra note 25, at 1729 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
92. See Reich, The New Property, supra note 26, at 785–87. 
93. See generally Charles A. Reich, The Liberty Impact of the New Property, 31 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 295 (1990) [hereinafter Reich, The Liberty Impact]. 
94. Reich, The New Property, supra note 26, at 785–86. 
95. See Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cty., 318 F. Supp. 3d 1293, 1296–1321 (M.D. Fla. 2018); 
see also Spade, supra note 22, at 775. 
95. Lisa Mottet, Modernizing State Vital Statistics Statutes and Policies to Ensure Accurate Gender 
Markers on Birth Certificates: A Good Government Approach to Recognizing the Lives of 
Transgender People, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 373, 379, 391–99 (2013) (“Policies that provide 
transgender people with identity documents that match their gender identity give them a better chance 
to live life in their gender, and avoid bias, discrimination, and violence in the areas most critical to 
quality of life, such as employment, housing, and education.”). 
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universities,96 participation in sex-segregated sports,97 ultimate placement 
in sex-segregated prisons,98 subsequent access to healthcare in prison,99 
and even fundamental rights.100 Both overarching theories support the 
premise that gender is property.101 
A. Traditional Property 
Broadly speaking, property is simply an entitlement “protected by 
formal legal institutions.”102 There are many factors that differentiate 
property from other forms of rights or claims, but the most defining is the 
right to exclude.103 For example, English jurist William Blackstone 
defined property as the “sole and despotic dominion which one man 
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total 
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”104 This 
profound description makes the right to exclude others a sufficient and 
conditional aspect of property. The idea that the right to exclude is of 
fundamental importance to property is known as the single-variable 
essentialist interpretation.105 
However, property may be more encompassing than the mere right to 
exclude. A separate school of thought, known as multiple-variable 
essentialism,106 perceives property as a “bundle of sticks,” with the right 
to exclude constituting merely one “stick” in a collection of rights 
and  privileges.107 
Yet another conception of property is nominalism, which “views 
property as a purely conventional concept with no fixed meaning.”108 
                                                   
96. See Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of the Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F. Supp. 
3d 657 (W.D. Pa. 2015). 
97. Buzuvis, supra note 22, at 5–7. 
98. See Crosby v. Reynolds, 763 F. Supp. 666 (D. Me. 1991) (sex-segregated prisons). 
99. See Kothmann v. Rosario, 558 F. App’x 907 (11th Cir. 2014) (same); Keohane v. Jones, 328 
F. Supp. 3d 1288 (N.D. Fla. 2018) (sex-segregated prisons and access to medical treatment);. 
100. See generally infra Part IV. 
101. See infra section V.A. 
102. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY 3 (2010) (ebook). 
103. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176–80 (1979) (“[W]e hold that the ‘right to 
exclude,’ so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls within this 
category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensation.”). 
104. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (1766) 
(emphasis  added). 
105. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 734 (1998). 
106. Id. at 734. 
107. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 102, at 5. 
108. Merrill, supra note 105, at 737. 
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Under nominalism, property is not dependent or reliant on the right to 
exclude, and the government can label just about anything as property.109 
Like multiple-variable essentialism, nominalism comprises a “bundle of 
sticks,” but it has no explicit, identifiable constituents.110 The United 
States Supreme Court has described property’s “bundle of sticks” just as 
vaguely: it is “a collection of individual rights which, in certain 
combinations, constitute property.”111 
Consequently, there is no firm consensus on the definition of property, 
or even how central the right to exclude is in evaluating property 
interests.112 “A legal system can label property as anything it wants to,” 
dependent on the social values and beliefs of its society.113 Yet, even 
absent a universally accepted definition, scholars agree that property must 
have certain characteristics.114 For purposes of this Comment, I consider 
the right to exclude as a persuasive element of property, in conjunction 
with the right to possess, the right to use, and the right to transfer.115 
B. The New Property 
In contrast to traditional theories of property, “new property” concerns 
government-created forms of wealth that society finds valuable. Charles 
Reich’s 1964 law review article The New Property first highlighted the 
distinction between traditional property and “new property.”116 Reich 
differentiated between traditional wealth, which is created by culture and 
society, and property, which is created by law.117 Occupational licenses, 
driver’s licenses, franchises, benefits, subsidies, use of public resources, 
and contracts are all examples of government-created wealth—or what he 
coined “the new property.”118 Today, according to Reich, the new 
property is “the rule rather than the exception.”119 
                                                   
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002). 
112. Merrill, supra note 105, at 734. But see Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179–80 
(1979) (finding that the right to exclude is a fundamental element of property). 
113. Merrill, supra note 105, at 737. 
114. Francisco J. Morales, Comment, The Property Matrix: An Analytical Tool to Answer the 
Question, “Is This Property?,” 161 U. PENN. L. REV. 1125, 1128–29 (2013). 
115. See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 4–5 (2d ed. 2007) (“[T]he most 
important sticks in the bundle are: (1) the right to exclude; (2) the right to transfer; and (3) the right 
to possess and use.”). 
116. See generally Reich, The New Property, supra note 26. 
117. Id. at 733. 
118. Id. at 734–37. 
119. Reich, The Liberty Impact, supra note 93, at 296. Although states have frequently used the 
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Reich also notes that courts are more likely to protect privileges that 
“are intimately bound up with the individual’s freedom to earn a 
living.”120 Several Supreme Court justices have opined that some 
government-created privileges may have more value than other forms of 
traditional property, as they implicate these liberty interests.121 Justice 
Black opined that, for a physician, the right to practice medicine is “a very 
precious part of . . . liberty . . . . It may mean more than any property,”122 
as it pertains to the pursuit of a common calling. Similarly, Justice 
Douglas highlighted government payrolls, defense and highway contracts, 
subsidies to air carriers and railroads, disbursements for scientific 
research, and television and radio licenses as examples of “new property,” 
which “directly or indirectly implicate the home life of the  recipients.”123 
Under Reich’s theory, “the law continues to treat forms of wealth that 
have become essentials as mere privileges,”124 even though more and 
more of an individual’s wealth “takes the form of rights or status rather 
than of tangible goods” or property.125 For example, it is commonly 
understood that there is no right to operate a motor vehicle; rather, it is a 
privilege subject to state regulation.126 But individuals who use motor 
vehicles to earn a livelihood have a particular property interest in retaining 
their driver’s licenses.127 
Another illustration is the right to marry. Marriage is a government-
created privilege128 and also a fundamental right under both equal 
                                                   
new property privileges that Reich discusses to advance civil rights causes, see, for example, 
Licensing Agencies: Race in Application Forms—California, 6 RACE REL. L. REP. 658 (1960), the 
proposed federal memorandum is fundamentally opposed to such a concept—instead, the policy 
maliciously brandishes gender markers as a limiting principle on transsex people’s lives. 
120. Reich, The New Property, supra note 26, at 741. 
121. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326–27 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Barsky v. Bd. 
of Regents of Univ., 347 U.S. 442, 459 (1954) (Black, J., dissenting); see also Reich, The Liberty 
Impact, supra note 93, at 305–06. 
122. Barsky, 347 U.S. at 459. 
123. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 326–27. 
124. Reich, The Liberty Impact, supra note 93, at 298 (emphasis added). 
125. Reich, The New Property, supra note 26, at 738. 
126. Id. at 740. 
127. See id. at 740–42. 
128. The Constitution is traditionally understood to protect “negative rights”—that is, rights that 
restrain the actions of government “to protect individual autonomy and personhood.” Rachel A. 
Washburn, Freedom of Marriage: An Analysis of Positive and Negative Rights, 8 WASH. U. JURIS. 
REV. 87, 95, 104 (2015). However, Obergefell v. Hodges arguably acknowledged a fundamental right 
that “ensures active protection by the federal government,” indicating that marriage has the 
characteristics of both a positive and negative right. Id. at 104–05. A positive right is one where there 
is “dependence on the judicial state” to exercise it. Id. at 105. 
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protection and due process jurisprudence.129 Once individuals are married, 
they have a negative right to retain their marriage, as it is interpreted as a 
property interest.130 In theory, if a state were to stop issuing marriage 
licenses, it would likely violate the equal protection clause unless it also 
rescinds all previously issued marriage licenses.131 However, it is highly 
unlikely that marriage licenses could be rescinded if the government 
stopped affirmatively offering marriage, as courts have “unanimously 
treated the changes in law as prospective only, typically concluding that 
pre-existing marriages [are] a sort of vested property right.”132 In short, 
“there is a separate substantive due process right to retain the status and 
attendant property interests once lawfully attained.”133 A similar analogy 
can be drawn to gender markers: once an amended marker is granted, 
transsex individuals have an interest to retain the marker and its attendant 
property interests. 
Synthesizing competing theories, property is, essentially, what the law 
will draw boundaries for, which enforce (or reorder) the existing regime 
of power.134 When it comes to gender, individuals have a property interest 
in maintaining an accurate gender marker, as gender exhibits qualities of 
traditional property. At a minimum, gender designations are examples of 
government-created licenses that society imbues with meaning and value. 
Under both scenarios, gender is property, and a transsex individual has a 
                                                   
129. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (“[T]he Court has long held 
the right to marry is protected by the Constitution.”); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki 
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (“[O]ur past decisions make clear that the right to marry is of 
fundamental importance . . . .”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“Marriage is one of the 
‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.” (quoting Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942))); id. at 12 (“The freedom to marry has long been recognized as 
one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”); see also 
Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 
1386–91 (2010).  
130. Peter Nicolas, Fundamental Rights in a Post-Obergefell World, 27 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 
331, 359 (2016). 
131. Id. at 360. 
132. Id. (emphasis added). Note, however, that marriage is a substantive due process right under 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. This example is 
therefore distinctive in that marriage has been declared “fundamental,” while a gender designation, 
or a right to a correct gender designation, has not. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (“[T]he 
decision to marry is a fundamental right under Zablocki v. Redhail and Loving v. Virginia.”) (citations 
omitted). However, if the “negative rights associated with marriage evaporated,” state governments 
could technically remove themselves from issuing marriage licenses altogether. Nicolas, supra note 
130, at 358–59. Nicolas argues it likely evaporated under Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
Id. at 355. In that situation, the same property and due process inquiry would likely arise. 
133. Id. at 360. 
134. Harris, supra note 25, at 1730. 
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constitutional interest in maintaining the property rights attendant to 
their  gender. 
III. COMPELLED SPEECH DOCTRINE 
Gender is also a form of speech protected by the First Amendment of 
the United States Constitution.135 The First Amendment states that federal 
and state governments “shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech.”136 The Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment to 
protect both the right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking.137 
The compelled speech doctrine states that the government may not require 
expression or utterance of a specific message, nor may it stifle speech on 
account of its message.138 Thus, the First Amendment protects individuals 
from forced expression of an ideology that they find 
personally  unacceptable.139 
At its heart, the First Amendment provides “that each person should 
decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, 
consideration, and adherence.”140 Crucially, the prohibition against 
compelled speech encompasses all speech, not just ideological and 
political speech.141 Because the principle underlying the compelled speech 
doctrine is to protect “freedom of mind,”142 the compelled speech doctrine 
                                                   
135. See, e.g., Zalewska v. Cnty. of Sullivan, N.Y., 316 F.3d 314, 320 (2d Cir. 2003) (recognizing 
that a trans “high school student’s decision to wear traditionally female clothes to school as an 
expression of female gender identity [is] protected speech”); Kastl v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 
No. Civ.02–1531PHX–SRB, 2004 WL 2008954, at *9 (D. Ariz. June 3, 2004) (finding that a transsex 
woman’s expression of gender is a kind of speech directed to the public); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits, 
No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000), aff’d sub nom Doe v. 
Brockton Sch. Comm., No. 2000-J-638, 2000 WL 33342399 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000); 
Grzywna ex rel. Doe v. Schenectady Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F. Supp. 2d 139, 144 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(holding that patriotic accessorization of outfits constituted “speech”); A.A. ex rel. Betenbaugh v. 
Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 701 F. Supp. 2d 863, 882–83 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (holding that a Native 
American male student’s braids were communicative enough to constitute “speech”); see also 
Danielle Weatherby, From Jack to Jill: Gender Expression as Protected Speech in the Modern 
Schoolhouse, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 89, 131 (2015) (arguing that use of gendered 
restrooms is speech itself). 
136. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
137. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). 
138. See id. at 717. 
139. Id. at 715. 
140. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 213 (2013) (quoting 
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 641 (1994)). 
141. Frudden v. Pilling, 742 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2014). 
142. Laurent Sacharoff, Listener Interests in Compelled Speech Cases, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 329, 
332 (2008). 
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has been interpreted liberally.143 The Supreme Court has held three 
general categories of compelled speech to be unconstitutional: 
(1) government action that forces a private speaker to propagate a 
particular message chosen by the government;144 (2) government action 
that forces a private speaker to accommodate or include another private 
speaker’s message;145 and (3) government action that forces an individual 
to subsidize or contribute to an organization that engages in speech the 
individual opposes.146 
The compelled speech doctrine was first developed in West Virginia 
State Board of Education v. Barnette,147 which represents the first 
prohibited category of compelled speech.148 Barnette concerned a West 
Virginia resolution that required school children to recite the pledge of 
allegiance and perform a stiff-arm salute to the flag of the United States.149 
Refusal to salute meant expulsion from school, and even criminal 
prosecution of parents due to child delinquency.150 In striking down the 
resolution, the Court found that flag salutes and symbolic gestures were a 
“form of utterance” and a “way of communicating ideas.”151 
After Barnette, the Supreme Court continued to expand the compelled 
speech doctrine. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,152 the Court 
established the second category of compelled speech. Tornillo concerned 
Florida’s “right-to-reply” statute, which required newspapers to provide a 
platform for response—free of cost—to political candidates if the 
newspaper had attacked their “personal character.”153 The Court held that 
Florida engaged in content discrimination by coercing newspapers into 
                                                   
143. See id. 
144. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717; W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).  
145. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 581 
(1995); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 12–16 (1986); Miami Herald Publ’g 
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). 
146. See United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 413 (2001); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ. 
431 U.S. 209 (1977), overruled in part by Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, County, and Mun. Emps., 
Council 31, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (striking down part of Abood on a more expansive 
interpretation of the First Amendment’s compelled speech doctrine). 
147. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
148. Id. 
149. Id. at 628–29.  
150. Id. at 629–30.  
151. Id. at 632. 
152. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
153. Id. at 244.  
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providing such a platform,154 and that the government could not force 
individuals to provide a platform for a particular message.155 
The last category of compelled speech, known as compelled subsidy, 
concerns government actions that force individuals to subsidize or partake 
in speech with which they disagree. It has seen recent expansion. In a 2018 
employment law case, the Supreme Court held that public-sector 
employers may not require non-member employees of a union to pay 
“agency fees,” which are a portion of union dues that cover only germane 
activities, unrelated to the union’s political or ideological projects.156 The 
Court found that the state’s agency fees violated the First Amendment as 
it subsidized the speech of other, private speakers—even when it funded 
activity with no specified political or ideological message.157 
The Supreme Court has also struck down laws that require 
dissemination of a speaker’s identity, which falls under the first category 
of compelled speech concerning mandated expression of particular 
content. For instance, the Court has invalidated a law that required 
identification of the distributor of any handbill158 as well as a law that 
prohibited circulation of anonymous leaflets in relation to political 
campaigns.159 In both of these cases, the government could not force 
individuals to disclose personal and sensitive information. In contrast, the 
Court in Doe v. Reed160 refused to invalidate a Washington State statute 
that required disclosure of the names and addresses of individuals who 
signed referendum ballot petitions, in part because of the State’s 
legitimate interest in preserving electoral integrity.161 The Court did, 
however, hint that a narrower holding may be necessary in a case where a 
plaintiff can show “a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure 
[of personal information] will subject them to threats, harassment, 
or  reprisals.”162 
The Trump Administration’s new gender policy implicates the First 
Amendment’s compelled speech doctrine because the federal government 
assigns an expression of speech to each individual—their gender—which 
                                                   
154. Id. at 254, 258. 
155. Id. at 258. 
156. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun. Emps., Council 31, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 
2455–56, 2460–61 (2018). 
157. Id. at 2464, 2478. 
158. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (finding the ordinance “void on its face”). 
159. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
160. 561 U.S. 186 (2010). 
161. Id. 
162. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 
558 U.S. 310, 368–69 (2010). 
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the individual must then disseminate every time they show identification. 
In many cases, this dissemination requires additional compelled speech to 
explain the discrepancy between their lived gender and marked gender, 
which frequently places transsex people in danger of harassment or 
discrimination.163 This scenario inevitably arises under the Trump 
Administration’s proposal, and it constitutes government-
compelled  speech. 
IV. GENDER AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
Gender protects fundamental rights enshrined by the Due Process 
Clause and Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States 
Constitution. To begin, the Due Process Clause protects individuals from 
deprivation of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”164 It 
has been interpreted to have both procedural and substantive 
components.165 This Comment will overview its substantive component, 
which protects certain fundamental rights. In addition, the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 provides that “Citizens of each 
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the 
several States.”166 Privileges and immunities are interpreted as rights 
granted by federal citizenship—sometimes stemming from natural law, 
state and federal law, or the Bill of Rights.167 This Part will demonstrate 
that gender designations influence the exercise of  substantive due process 
rights and privileges and immunities. Thus, accurate gender designations 
are pivotal to protecting the liberty interests of transsex people. 
A. Substantive Due Process Rights 
Since 1937,168 the Supreme Court has discerned two primary categories 
of substantive due process rights: those that are enumerated against state 
                                                   
163. See infra section IV.B. 
164. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
165. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & TONI M. MASSARO, THE ARC OF DUE PROCESS IN AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 38, 47 (2013); RHONDA WASSERMAN, PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: A 
REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 1 (2004). 
166. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
167.  Thomas H. Burrell, A Story of Privileges and Immunities: From Medieval Concept to the 
Colonies and United States Constitution, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 7, 8 (2011); Note, Congress’s Power 
to Define the Privileges and Immunities of Citizenship, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1206, 1206–07 (2015);; 
see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 166 (1968) (Black, J., concurring); CHARLES L. BLACK, 
JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM 74–75 (1997); Akhil R. Amar, Substance and Method in the Year 
2000, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 601, 631  (2001). 
168. In 1937, the United States Supreme Court decided West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 
379 (1937). This case ended the infamous Lochner era, in which the Court regularly struck down 
 
17 McConnell.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/28/20  7:22 PM 
2020] THE LIBERTY IMPACT OF GENDER 481 
 
and federal governments through the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth 
Amendment, and those that are unenumerated fundamental rights implicit 
in due process liberty.169 The latter category is frequently implicated by 
gender. For example, as previously illustrated, a transsex person’s ability 
to exercise their right to marry was historically dependent on legal 
determination of gender.170 This section will continue this discussion by 
examining disparities in the realm of parentage, demonstrating that legal 
gender has an enduring role in the exercise of substantive due 
process  rights. 
An individual’s gender designation may impinge on the liberty interest 
of parents “in the care, custody, and control of their children.”171 Since 
Meyer v. Nebraska,172 the right to have children has been considered 
fundamental and protected by the substantive component of the Due 
Process Clause.173 States still differentiate parentage rights on the basis of 
gender—for example, in issuing the names and respective rights of 
“mothers” and “fathers”—and therefore a proper gender designation is 
critical.174 Since states continue to differentiate parental rights based on 
gender, a transsex person’s gender designation may impinge on the liberty 
interest of parents in bringing up children. 
Gender is significant in the common law presumption of parenthood.175 
Most states continue to presume that the “biological” father of a child is 
the husband of a woman who gives birth.176 In terms of the presumption 
of parenthood, “the law is not settled . . . [on] circumstances under which 
the presumption can be resettled.”177 While the presumption of legitimacy 
                                                   
social and economic legislation on the grounds that such laws interfered with liberty of contract. See, 
e.g., Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (holding that federal legislation that 
established a minimum wage for women and children was unconstitutional); Lochner v. New York, 
198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that state legislation that limited weekly working hours for bakers was 
unconstitutional). This set forth a new era of due process jurisprudence, in which rights must be 
“sufficiently ‘fundamental’ to trigger elevated judicial scrutiny.” See SULLIVAN & MASSARO, supra 
note 165, at 48–50. 
169. SULLIVAN & MASSARO, supra note 165, at 51. 
170. See supra Part I. 
171. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). 
172. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
173. See generally Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
174. Melanie B. Jacobs, Parental Parity: Intentional Parenthood’s Promise, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 465, 
478 (2016). 
175. Id. 
176. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION & NAT'L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., PROTECTING THE 
RIGHTS OF TRANSGENDER PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN: A GUIDE 
FOR  PARENTS  AND LAWYERS 17 (2013), [hereinafter Rights of Transgender Parents] https://www.
aclu.org/files/assets/aclu-tg_parenting_guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/DTP2-HZMK].  
177. Id. at 18. 
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for married individuals “is one of the most firmly-established and 
persuasive precepts known in law,”178 it fails to properly entitle transsex 
individuals to parentage rights. The marital presumption, generally, 
dictates that a man married to a woman who gives birth is the presumptive 
biological father.179 The United States Supreme Court has recently casted 
doubt on this traditional structure, holding that same-sex couples need to 
be granted the same benefits of marriage—including the parental 
presumption—as opposite-sex couples.180 However, states continue to 
differentiate between “biological” parents and other parents in some 
respects.181 For instance, several states continue to delineate that “the 
marital presumption serves as a proxy for biological parenthood.”182 
When an individual’s gender marker is accurate, they are entitled to the 
same presumption as a cissex individual of their gender.183 Therefore, an 
accurate gender designation is important to parents seeking to utilize the 
marital presumption. 
However, it should be noted that an accurate gender marker does not 
assure that a transsex person will obtain and retain parental rights. The 
rights of a transsex person to parenthood are often, and unfortunately, 
implicated when that individual is discovered to be transsex, and the state 
subsequently revokes parental rights based, at least in part, on gender 
identity.184 Even transsex parents of biological children are at risk of 
having their parental rights challenged if “they used assisted 
reproduction.”185 In these cases, individuals are best able to conceal their 
transsex status when their gender marker matches their external 
presentation of gender. 
Courts have discriminated against transsex parents solely because they 
are transsex. In In re Marriage of Simmons,186 for instance, a transsex 
man’s marriage to a woman was invalidated, and his parental rights 
reversed, even though his birth certificate accurately listed his male 
                                                   
178. Baker v. Baker, 582 S.E.2d 102, 103 (2003). 
179. Jacobs, supra note 174, at 478; Marjorie M. Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-
Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 317 (1990). 
180. Pavan v. Smith, 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078 (2017). 
181. For an overview on how the law continues to differentiate between “biological” and social 
parents, often to the disability of LGBTQ parents, see Douglas Nejaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 
126 YALE L.J. 2260, 2264–65, 2323–26 (2017). 
182. Id. at 2295–96. 
183. It should be noted that gay couples are also left out of the marital presumption in these states. 
Id. Therefore, gay transsex people would not benefit from an accurate gender designation. 
184. See infra Part I. 
185. Rights of Transgender Parents, supra note 176, at 18. 
186. 825 N.E.2d 303 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
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gender.187 The same occurred in Kantaras v. Kantaras,188 where a Florida 
court found that a “postoperative female-to-male transsexual person 
[could not] validly marry a female.”189 In the latter case, the court withheld 
opinion of the legal status of the children for a trial court to examine 
on  remand.190 
Judicial knowledge of an individual’s transness, as revealed by a 
conflicting, incorrect gender marker, implicates the right to care, custody, 
and control of children. In J.L.S. v. D.K.S.,191 two parents—a cissex and 
transsex woman—appealed from a decree of dissolution of their marriage. 
The cissex mother alleged that the transsex mother had “adopted a 
lifestyle such that it would be extremely harmful to [their] minor 
children,” and to preserve the best interests of the minor children, only the 
cissex mother should have visitation and custody.192 While the trial court 
issued visitation and temporary custody to the transsex mother, the Court 
of Appeals of Missouri reversed and awarded sole custody to the cissex 
mother, finding that “the overwhelming evidence indicates that the parties 
now do not share any commonality of beliefs regarding the raising of the 
minor children.”193 The court found that the transsex mother’s gender 
identity, among other things, was evidence that the parents did not have a 
“commonality of beliefs concerning parental decisions.”194 
Such decisions are not a relic of antiquity.195 In 2007, a Washington 
Court of Appeals determined that a transsex parent should not have 
primary custody over a child because the “impact of [the parent’s] gender 
reassignment surgery on the children is unknown.”196 In the most extreme 
                                                   
187. Id. at 307. 
188. 884 So.2d 155 (Fla. Ct. App. 2004). 
189. Id. at 155. 
190. Id. at 161. 
191. 943 S.W.2d 766 (Miss. Ct. Ap. 1997). But see Christian v. Randall, 516 P.2d 132, 132–33 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that a transsex man’s transition was not “sufficient evidence” to find 
that a custody transfer was in the best interests of the children); In re Marriage of D.F.D. and D.G.D., 
862 P.2d 368, 375 (Mont. 1993) (reversing a trial court’s determination that a transsex mother’s 
transness would be irreparably harmful to her son, holding that the conclusion was unsupported by 
evidence). 
192. J.L.S., 943 S.W.2d at 770. 
193. Id. at 774. 
194. Id. at 774–45. 
195. Helen Y. Chang, My Father is a Woman, Oh No!: The Failure of the Courts to Uphold 
Individual Substantive Due Process Rights for Transgender Parents Under the Guise of the Best 
Interest of the Child, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 649, 651 (2003). 
196. Magnuson v. Magnuson, 141 Wash. App. 347, 350, 170 P.3d 65, 66 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007); 
see also Cisek v. Cisek, No. 80 C.A. 113, 1982 WL 6161, *1–2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 20, 1982) (“[T]he 
transsexualism of the [parent] would have a sociopathic affect [sic] on the child . . . without 
appropriate intervention.”). 
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cases, courts have completely severed the parent-child relationship 
because the parent was transsex. For instance, a Kentucky Court of 
Appeals in 2007 terminated the parent-child relationship of one transsex 
mother because of her gender identity and its purported effect on the 
child.197 According to a 2011 national survey, 13% of parent respondents 
reported that “courts limited or stopped relationships with children due to 
their transgender identity or gender non-conformity.”198 
Another unfortunate reality for transsex parents rearing children is that 
courts have not hesitated to compel individuals to adhere to gender 
stereotypes, often in express conflict with their gender.199 For example, 
child custody orders may require transsex parents to perform or express 
gender in a certain way to maintain parental rights.200 Specifically, a 
transsex parent may be required conceal their gender identity from their 
child whenever the court determines it is “necessary to protect the child 
from harm.”201 Such orders stem from transphobic and unfounded notions 
about the inherent harm a parent’s transition can have on children.202 
Court orders that demand expression of a specific gender directly impact 
a transsex person’s ability to raise their children, and they also likely 
implicate the First Amendment, as gender expression is a form of 
personal  speech.203 
B. Privileges and Immunities 
Gender also implicates liberties protected by the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause. An inaccurate gender designation restricts an 
                                                   
197. M.B. v. D.W., 236 S.W.3d 31, 35, 38 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007). 
198.  JAMIE M. GRANT, LISA A. MOTTET & JUSTIN TANIS, INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT 
OF  THE  NATIONAL  TRANSGENDER  DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 88 (2011), https://www.transequalit
y.org/sites/default/files/docs/resources/NTDS_Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/QT3Y-ZC45] (“Courts 
limited or stopped relationships with children for 13% of respondents, with Black, Asian, and 
multiracial respondents experiencing higher rates of court interference.” (emphasis omitted)); Beth 
A. Haines et al., Making Trans Parents Visible: Intersectionality of Trans and Parenting Identities, 
24 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 238, 239 (2014). 
199. See infra notes 200, 201. 
200. Jeffrey Kosbie, (No) State Interests in Regulating Gender: How Suppression of Gender 
Nonconformity Violates Freedom of Speech, 19 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 187, 217 (2013). 
201. Rights of Transgender Parents, supra note 176, at 7, 16. Courts have considered the 
concealment of transsex identity to be a relevant factor in determining parental rights. See P.L.W. v. 
T.R.W., 890 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that transsex parent did not present at their 
actual gender in front of the child); In re the Marriage of D.F.D. and D.G.D., 862 P.2d 368 (Mont. 
1993) (same). 
202. See Jayke Pyne, Greta Bauer & Kaitlin Bradley, Transphobia and Other Stressors Impacting 
Trans Parents, 11 J. GLBT FAM. STUD. 107, 108 (2015). 
203. See infra section V.B. 
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individual’s liberty interest to pursue an occupation or common calling. 
This is what the Lochner-era Supreme Court infamously referred to as 
“the right of the citizen . . . to live and work where he will; to earn his 
livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation.”204 
Originally thought to be protected by the substantive component of the 
Due Process Clause, the right to pursue a common calling is now 
interpreted under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.205 The Trump 
Administration’s policy threatens transsex people’s right to earn a 
livelihood in that it exposes transsex individuals to employment 
discrimination, and potentially, procedural disqualification from 
employment for having a mismatched gender designation.206 
Transsex people are frequently subjected to employment 
discrimination, and, in some circuits, receive no protection from 
termination based on their gender identity.207 When an employee is forced 
                                                   
204. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). 
205. McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 227 (2013); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 (1978). 
See also generally Randy E. Barnett, Does the Constitution Protect Economic Liberty?, 35 HARV. J. 
L. & PUB. POL’Y 5 (2012). 
206. One crucial and cautionary point on the Privileges and Immunities Clause should be noted. 
The United States Supreme Court has never incorporated the clause against the federal government. 
The Court has repeatedly struck down state laws that discriminate against rights and liberties 
recognized under the clause. See, e.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) (holding that an 
Alaskan statute that required in-state oil and gas companies to give state residents a hiring preference 
to be unconstitutional); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (holding that a South Carolina statute 
that required a non-resident to pay one-hundred times as much as a resident for a shrimping license 
was unconstitutional). The Fourteenth Amendment clearly incorporates the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause against state governments, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; however, Article IV, section 2 has not 
been interpreted to restrict federal power. See, e.g., Pollack v. Duff, 793 F.3d 34, 44 (2015) (“[W]e 
think the weight of the evidence indicates the Privileges and Immunities Clause was not originally 
understood as a limitation upon the authority of the federal government.”); Nehme v. INS, 252 F.3d 
415, 430 n.18 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he Privileges and Immunities Clause [of Article IV] protects 
citizens of one state from abuses by other states, and does not address powers, such as the granting of 
citizenship, of the federal government.”); Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1030 n.7 (5th Cir.1991) 
(“While we have held that state legislation may violate the privileges and immunities clause of article 
IV if it unjustifiably denies the right to travel, that clause applies only to state legislation and does not 
govern federal statutes.”); Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1555 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he Privileges 
and Immunities Clause [of Article IV] has been construed as a limitation on the powers of the States, 
not on the powers of the federal government.”); Hawes v. Club Ecuestre El Comandante, 535 F.2d 
140, 145 (1st Cir. 1976) (“Article IV, § 2 is a limitation on powers of states and in no way affects the 
powers of a federal district court.”). Because of the lack of incorporation, the impacts of gender on 
privileges and immunities appears less compelling than its impacts on substantive due process rights. 
This Comment nonetheless highlights them because they are fundamental rights enshrined in the 
United States Constitution, to which every individual has an interest in exercising.  
207. However, the United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari on the issue of whether 
transsex people are protected under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which will determine 
whether transsex people may have their employment terminated on account of gender identity; and, 
potentially, whether cissex people must to conform to gender stereotypes to retain employment. R.G. 
& G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (Mem.) (Apr. 22, 2019).  
 
17 McConnell.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/28/20  7:22 PM 
486 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:459 
 
to disclose their identity due to a mismatched document, they are placing 
themselves at both physical and economic risk. The numbers are alarming. 
More than three-fourths of transgender people have reported some form 
of workplace discrimination, and “one in four transgender people have 
lost a job due to bias.”208 The misidentification of a transsex person’s 
gender can also create a “stigma” or “disability” that forecloses 
employment opportunities whenever a transsex person has to “out” 
themselves.209 Forced outing may stigmatize an individual and “seriously 
damage [their] standing and associations in [their] community.”210 This is 
particularly alarming, as the larger transgender community already has an 
unemployment rate of up to 70%.211 
In addition, if an individual’s identification card (“ID”) does not 
accurately reflect their gender, they may face difficulty obtaining or 
maintaining employment.212 A legitimate ID is necessary for most legal 
employment in the United States.213 Some states require that an 
individual’s federal gender marker match state records before issuance of 
a state ID.214 In this situation, if a transsex man is seeking an ID from the 
state, his state gender marker must match the one listed on his federal 
documents.215 The federal government has utilized a similar tactic that can 
preclude employment. For example, the Social Security Administration 
(“SSA”) used a technique called “gender matching” for public sector 
employees until 2011, which required that a person’s gender designation 
in the Social Security database match that indicated on a work 
application.216 The SSA recently resumed issuing “no-match” letters in 
2019 for employee’s names and Social Security numbers, and notices may 
be triggered by “typographical errors, unreported name changes, and 
                                                   
208. Employment, NAT'L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., https://transequality.org/ 
issues/employment [https://perma.cc/PJ9W-686P]. 
209. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972). 
210. Id. 
211. Spade, supra note 75, at 751–52. 
212. Id. 
213. See I-9, Employment Verification, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., 
https://www.uscis.gov/i-9 [https://perma.cc/VAS3-TJUU]. 
214. Spade, supra note 75, at 737–38.  
215. See id.  
216. Know Your Rights – Social Security, NAT'L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., 
https://transequality.org/know-your-rights/social-security [https://perma.cc/WH7H-YMVS] (“What 
About ‘No-Match Letters’? Will My SSA Record Out Me on the Job or Elsewhere?”); Waymon 
Hudson, Social Security Ends “Gender No-Match” Letters for Employees, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 
21, 2011), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/social-security-ends-gender-no-match_b_966654 
[https://perma.cc/3H28-K64J]. 
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inaccurate or incomplete employer records.”217 Like occupational and 
professional licenses, federal benefits, and drivers’ licenses, inaccurate 
gender designations impinge on a transsex person’s ability to earn a living, 
which is a particularly sensitive liberty interest.218 Gender designations 
thus have a profound impact on many aspects of a transsex person’s life.219 
Overall, the effectuation of substantive due process rights and 
privileges and immunities are influenced by gender designations, and 
sometimes, transsex status itself. In the realm of parentage and 
employment, gender markers remain regrettably relevant. The impact of 
gender may go largely unseen by cissex individuals, because a proper 
gender designation offers them effortless access to facilities and 
accommodations.220 However, the impacts are significant enough to 
inhibit, or preclude entirely, exercise of fundamental rights. In such 
scenarios, transsex people with accurate gender designations are better 
able to conceal their transsex status and protect their liberty interests. As 
the next Part will show, legal gender not only tangentially impacts 
fundamental rights, but is a right in and of itself. 
V. THE LIBERTY IMPACT OF GENDER 
This Part contends that gender is a property right and protected form of 
speech. Section A first illustrates how gender exhibits characteristics of 
both traditional property and “new property,” finding that transsex 
individuals have a property interest in retaining accurate gender 
                                                   
217.
Employer Correction Request Notices (EDCOR), SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,  https://www.ssa.gov/employe
r/notices.html [https://perma.cc/798P-RD66]; Laura D. Francis, Social  Security  No-
Match  Letters Causing Concern (Corrected), DAILY LABOR REPORT (May 7, 2019), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/social-security-no-match-letters-worry-
immigrants-bosses [https://perma.cc/A3FJ-8YG3].  
218. Reich, supra note 26, at 740–42. 
219. Lisa Mottet, Modernizing State Vital Statistics Statutes and Policies to Ensure Accurate 
Gender Markers on Birth Certificates: A Good Government Approach to Recognizing the Lives of 
Transgender People, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 373, 398 (2013); Spade, supra note 75, at 775; supra 
Part IV. 
220. This claim should be caveated by the fact that some cissex and non-intersex people face similar 
hurdles and occasionally violence for not adhering to heteronormativity or cisnormativity. See, e.g., 
Reginald Hardwick, Man Follows Woman Into Restroom Over ‘Perceived’ Gender, NBCDFW (May 
1, 2016, 10:21 PM), https://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/Man-Follows-Woman-Into-Restroom-
Over-Perceived-Gender-377761441.html [https://perma.cc/PP57-VVCY]; Matt DeRienzo, Woman 
Mistaken for Transgender Harassed in Walmart Bathroom, NEWS TIMES (May 16, 2016, 3:50 PM) 
[https://perma.cc/UDG3-VUKV]; Mitch Kellaway, Woman Sues Restaurant that Ejected Her from 
Bathroom for Looking ‘Like a Man,’ ADVOCATE (June 17, 2015, 7:26 AM), 
https://www.advocate.com/business/2015/06/17/detroit-woman-kicked-out-restaurant-bathroom-
looking-man-sues [https://perma.cc/R8D8-4MR8]. 
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designations. Section B then establishes that inaccurate gender 
designations are independently unconstitutional under the compelled 
speech doctrine of the First Amendment. The way that gender manifests 
itself through property and speech rights indicates that people have a 
constitutional interest in maintaining an accurate gender designation. 
Therefore, the Trump Administration’s policy impermissibly deprives 
transsex individuals of their right to an accurate gender designation. 
A. Gender as Property 
Gender constitutes a property right, under traditional conceptions of 
property and government-created privileges known as “new property.” 
Depending on the school of thought, gender may encompass all or some 
of traditional property’s characteristics. Property rights have been 
described as a “bundle of sticks,” which typically includes the right to 
exclude,221 and the capability of possession, use, and transfer.222 This 
section will overview common conceptions of property and illustrate how 
institutions perpetuate and protect the legal identity of gender. 
First, gender markers contain a core aspect of property: the ability to 
exclude. Maleness and femaleness are distinct categories, constructed as 
a legal identity by state governments,223 to which members of each 
category exclude one another. Typically, only men may have a “male” 
designation, and only women have a “female” designation. Therefore, for 
a gender designation to have any value, it must exclude others—
specifically, people of other genders, or perhaps those that do not conform 
to heteronormativity.224 This allows the designation of “male” or “female” 
to have tangible use in society. 
Gender also occupies the property trait of possession. Individuals may 
“possess” their gender by adhering to heteronormative225 conceptions of 
that gender.226 This possession includes the right to use and enjoyment, as 
gender “is something that can both be experienced and deployed as a 
resource.”227 For example, adhering to traditional markers of the male 
gender allows someone to—at least briefly—possess maleness and reap 
                                                   
221. On the right to exclude, see generally Merrill, supra note 105. 
222. On possession, use, and transfer, see Anna di Robilant, Property: A Bundle of Sticks or a 
Tree?, 66 VAND. L. REV. 869, 879–881 (2013). 
223. See supra Part I. 
224. Wigginton, supra note 24, at 151 (noting that “the law endows the holders of heteronormative 
identities with all the rights in the ‘bundle of sticks’”). 
225. See supra note 27. 
226. Wigginton, supra note 24Error! Bookmark not defined., at 145. 
227. Harris, supra note 25, at 1734. 
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reward from the gender’s presentation. Although the federal government 
may not enforce gender stereotypes upon people,228 the value of gender 
markers comes from people’s ability to adequately possess the gender 
designation—that is, to “pass”229 as the gender they are designated. For a 
gender marker “to have any value, its holder’s appearance must match that 
marker.”230 Therefore, when an individual passes as their gender, they are 
taking advantage of the privileges associated with maleness and 
femaleness.231 
Lastly, gender may be transferred. The most obvious example of 
transfer is from the genetic parent-child link.232 Genetic sex is ultimately 
inherited from genetic parents233 and neurological sex is theorized to be 
influenced by genetic factors.234 Some studies indicate that gender identity 
is also influenced by hormones, which similarly derive from parents—
meaning that an individual’s gender is ultimately transferred through 
biological factors from parent to child.235 The law facilitates this transfer 
by requiring medical practitioners to designate a gender marker “as soon 
as possible” after a child’s birth.236 Beyond genetic factors, gender may 
also be transferred by the imposition and social conditioning of gender 
                                                   
228. See Stephanie Bornstein, The Law of Gender Stereotyping and the Work-Family Conflicts of 
Men, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1297 (2012) (delineating the causes of action under federal statutes for 
unconstitutional gender stereotyping); Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in 
Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 91 (2010) (explaining the 
constitutional jurisprudence prohibiting gender stereotyping that emerged in the 1970s). 
229. “Passing” generally refers to “a transgender person’s ability to be correctly perceived as the 
gender they identify as.” Jae A. Lee, What Does “Passing” Mean in Terms of Transgender People?, 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 10, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/what-does-passing-mean-
within-the-transgender-community_us_593b85e9e4b014ae8c69e099 [https://perma.cc/5WCF-
67N3]. However, cissex people may also not “pass” if they do not conform to heteronormative 
conceptions of gender. As a result, both transsex and cissex people find value in sufficiently 
“possessing” their genders. See, e.g., supra note 220. 
230. Wigginton, supra note 24, at 150. 
231. Harris, supra note 19, under “right to use and enjoyment.” 
232. Cf. Wigginton, supra note 24, at 148. 
233. Id. 
234. Arthur P. Arnold, Sex Chromosomes and Brain Gender, 5 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 
701 (2004) (arguing that “[g]enes on the sex chromosomes probably determine the gender (sexually 
dimorphic phenotype) of the brain in two ways: by acting on the gonads to induce sex differences in 
levels of gonadal secretions that have sex-specific effects on the brain, and by acting in the brain itself 
to differentiate XX and XY brain cells”). 
235. Stuart Tobet et al., Brain Sex Differences and Hormone Influences: A Moving Experience?, 
21 J. NEUROENDROCRINOLOGY 1 (2009), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2669491/
pdf/nihms-99144.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5TE-A23A] (“Both genetic and hormonal factors likely 
contribute to physiological mechanisms in development to generate the ontogeny of sexual 
dimorphisms in brain.”).  
236. Wigginton, supra note 24, at 150. 
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stereotypes. For instance, “most children will be born to heterosexual [and 
cissex] parents, many of whom will maintain roles consistent with the 
dimensions of maleness or femaleness.”237 This is a transfer of gender’s 
most utilized mechanisms of possession and use: stereotyping. Studies 
have suggested that children who conform to gender stereotypes are less 
likely than their non-stereotypic peers to face physical, verbal, and peer-
reported aggression,238 as well as social exclusion.239 Conformity with 
gender stereotypes thus provides an individual with the best tools to utilize 
gender’s property interests in society. As a result, gender has traditional 
characteristics of property, because individuals may exclude others from 
their gender designation and possess, use, and transfer gender. 
Gender designations are also exceptionally similar in character and 
function to “new property.” This is evident by how an accurate gender 
designation impacts the exercise of substantive due process rights and 
privileges and immunities.240 Individuals may use their gender 
designation to exercise certain  rights and benefits; indeed, gender 
designations were historically used to prevent transsex people from 
exercising their substantive due process rights.241 Although some 
examples are now archaic, such as the right to marry,242 gender still has 
an important influence on fundamental rights.243 For example, there is a 
close link between gender’s use and its stereotyping mechanisms. 
Individuals who possess femaleness may use femaleness to “gain custody 
of children via courts’ presumption of maternal custody.”244 The use of 
gender in this scenario implicates the fundamental right to rear children. 
In contrast, maleness has traditionally been used to acquire higher 
wages245 and positions of power.246 
The Trump memorandum serves as an example of the federal 
government characterizing social essentials—such as having a gender 
marker congruent with one’s identity and lived experience—as a mere 
“privilege” to be granted or rescinded by the government. In reality, 
                                                   
237. Id. at 149. 
238. Laura Aspenlieder et al., Gender Nonconformity and Peer Victimization in Pre- and Early 
Adolescence, 3 EURO. J. DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 3, 3–16 (2009). 
239. Melanie Killen & Charles Stangor, Children’s Social Reasoning About Inclusion and 
Exclusion in Gender and Race Peer Group Contexts, 72 CHILD DEV. 174, 174–86  (2001). 
240. See supra Part IV. 
241. See supra Part IV. 
242. See supra note 32 (concerning the right to marry after Obergefell). 
243. See supra Part IV. 
244. Wigginton, supra note 24, at 147. 
245. Id. at 146. 
246. Every president of the United States has been male; additionally, approximately 81% of 
congressional members are male. Id. 
17 McConnell.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/28/20  7:22 PM 
2020] THE LIBERTY IMPACT OF GENDER 491 
 
gender designations have taken on a form of usable property, embedded 
and legitimized by law. Whether it is conceived under the traditional 
property model, or the more encompassing government-created form of 
wealth, gender is property. Because of these property interests, transsex 
people have a vested interest in maintaining an accurate 
gender  designation. 
B. Gender as Speech 
In addition to the property interests inherent to gender, gender 
designations act as an expression of gender identity, which is itself a form 
of speech. The Trump Administration’s proposal would rubberstamp a 
gender on every individual, based on initial gender assignment at birth. 
For transsex people, the marker would directly conflict with their lived 
experience and personal identification. Both the presentation of an 
incorrect gender marker, and the disclosure that a marker is “amended,” 
are examples of compelled speech that is impermissible under the First 
Amendment. Incorrect gender markers force transsex individuals to 
disclose that they are a different gender than indicated and force 
individuals to “out” themselves as transsex to explain the discrepancy. For 
instance, transsex people may be accused of identity theft for presenting 
an obviously conflicting identification document.247 Both disclosure of 
their actual gender and transsex status deprives transsex individuals of 
their right to “decide for [themselves] the ideas and beliefs deserving of 
expression, consideration, and adherence.”248 
When individuals present identification documents with gender 
markers, it is to answer the fundamental question: “Who are you?”249 
Under the Trump Administration’s policy, transsex individuals are forced 
to propagate a message that they fundamentally disagree with: that their 
gender is what the federal government indicates, rather than what their 
neurological biology or lived experience dictates it is. The First 
Amendment forbids federal and state governments from “telling people 
what they must say”250—especially with regards to speech that touches 
                                                   
247. See, e.g., Cat Reid, Lawsuit Challenges Kansas Birth Certificate Policy for Transgender 
People, KSHB (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.kshb.com/news/local-news/lawsuit-challenges-kansas-
birth-certificate-policy [https://perma.cc/38NT-TY43] (explaining that one of the plaintiffs 
challenging Kansas’ birth certificate policy, which does not permit gender marker alterations, has 
been accused of identity theft for presenting an identification document with an inaccurate gender). 
248. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 213 (2013) (quoting 
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994)). 
249. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, F.V. v. Barron, 
286 F. Supp. 3d 1131 (D. Idaho 2018) (No. 1:17-cv-00170-CWD), 2017 WL 10398823, at *11.  
250. Agency for Int’l Dev., 570 U.S. at 213. 
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the heart as closely as gender identity. The policy would use citizens as a 
“mouthpiece[ ] for official orthodoxy,”251 in that it would force 
individuals to express a gender that is at odds with personal identity, 
experience, and frequently, science.252 Consequently, forced expression 
of gender through an inaccurate gender designation impinges on the 
First  Amendment. 
Importantly, the damages that stem from compelled speech of gender 
cannot be mitigated. A transsex person can typically disclaim an 
inaccurate gender marker, such as by disclosing that they are transsex. 
However, transsex people face physical, verbal, and sexual harassment 
and discrimination in housing and employment based on their transsex 
status.253 Forced disclosure of an individual’s transsex status places them 
in unnecessary danger of discrimination and harassment.254 For example, 
the 2015 United States Transgender Survey indicates that 46% of 
transgender participants were verbally harassed in the last year, and one-
in-ten individuals were physically attacked, based on their gender 
identity.255 These devasting numbers are in addition to the discriminatory 
risk transsex people face in employment and housing.256 
A transsex person’s ability to mitigate damages from compelled speech 
would therefore rely on placing themselves in the more difficult situation 
of having to “out” themselves and face subsequent stigma, harassment, 
and discrimination. Even absent transphobia and the social impact of 
being “outed” as a transsex person, an individual’s transsex status is 
deeply personal and private information that deserves First Amendment 
protection in its own right. As the Second Circuit stated: “The 
excruciatingly private and intimate nature of transsexualism, for persons 
who wish to preserve privacy in the matter, is really beyond debate.”257 
An individual’s transsex status is speech that an individual has a right to 
keep private against coerced disclosure. Under the Trump 
Administration’s redefinition of gender, disclosure may be required in 
                                                   
251. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 435 (5th ed. 2013). 
252. See supra notes 3, 234, 235. 
253. See supra section IV.C. 
254. See, e.g., Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 111–12 (2d Cir. 1999) (“It is . . . obvious that an 
individual who reveals that she is a transsexual ‘potentially exposes herself . . . to discrimination and 
intolerance.’”). 
255. JAMES, S. E. ET AL., THE REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY, NATIONAL CENTER 
FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY 13 (2016),  https://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/USTS-
Full-Report-FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/R286-VVXG]. 
256. Id. at 152–55; 176–80 (“Nearly one-quarter (23%) of respondents experienced some form of 
housing discrimination in the past year, such as being evicted from their home or denied a home or 
apartment because of being transgender.”). 
257. Powell, 175 F.3d at 111. 
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almost all circumstances where an individual’s gender marker conflicts 
with their gender presentation. 
At a minimum, an individual’s transsex status is protected by the 
prohibition against forced disclosure of a speaker’s identity. An 
individual’s transsex status is part of their identity—their gender identity. 
Like dissemination of speaker identity for the distributor of a handbill258 
or political leaflets,259 the government cannot force individuals to disclose 
sensitive and personal information. The harm is compounded when 
considering the frequency that individuals must present identification 
documents. A transsex person is likely further protected by Doe v. Reed’s 
dicta on threats and harassment; this is because transsex people can likely 
prove that compelled disclosure of their transness will “subject them to 
threats, harassment, or reprisals.”260 Therefore, special consideration 
should be given to transsex individuals, as a mismatched gender marker 
would frequently force them to disclose their transness, and may even 
place them in danger from a discriminatory world. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trump Administration’s policy raises concerns on the extent of 
federal power to control, coerce, and categorize people based on gender, 
absent individual consent or acquiescence. The federal government’s 
proposed policy, which demands an assigned, binary gender for every 
individual, will place tremendous burdens on transsex people and will 
even occasionally place burdens on cissex people. The Trump 
Administration’s redefinition undermines a transsex person’s property 
and speech rights inherent to their gender designation, which in turn 
implicate substantive due process rights and privileges and immunities. 
Because of the fundamental rights threatened, the Trump 
Administration’s redefinition of gender does not pass constitutional 
muster. And beyond the rights both enumerated and unenumerated by the 
United States Constitution, legal gender touches the heart of every 
individual’s life. Depriving transsex people of an accurate gender 
designation attempts to dissuade transsex people from engaging in public 
life, and ultimately, existing in the world. 
 
                                                   
258. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960) (finding the ordinance “void on its face”). 
259. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
260. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 
558 U.S. 310, 368–69 (2010). 
